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Water Quality Trading: What Can We Learn
From 10 Years of Wetland Mitigation Banking?
The mitigation banking industry has grown tremendously since the early 1990s. The regulatory architects of the
nascent water quality trading industry hope to learn from the mitigation banking experiment, replicating and
improving upon its successes while managing the unique challenges of a market that commodifies water quality.
BY ERIC RAFFINI AND MORGAN ROBERTSON
n 2003 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency issued its
Water Quality Trading Policy.1 Water quality trading allows
facilities facing high pollution-control costs to meet their
regulatory requirements by purchasing environmentally
equivalent or superior pollution reductions from another source, often
at a lower cost. The policy, which hopes to achieve “water quality and
environmental benefits greater than would otherwise be achieved under
more traditional regulatory approaches,” established the ground rules
for trading and encourages states, interstate agencies, and tribes to
develop and implement water quality trading programs for nutrients,
sediments, and other pollutants. The policy generated controversy
among some stakeholder groups; environmental organizations warned
that it would simply allow “polluters to avoid compliance by buying
credits” and let “the water quality in some lakes, streams, and rivers be
traded away for the benefit of other waterways.”2
However, since 2003 there has been significant interest and
increased receptivity among environmental organizations and
regulators toward the water quality trading concept.3 Buoyed by
targeted funding from EPA, more trading projects are underway
nationwide than ever before. More than 70 water quality trading
initiatives have been established since the 1980s, and at least 20 of those
efforts were begun within the last two years.
While not a panacea for water pollution problems, under certain
circumstances water quality trading can help states, tribes, and local
governments achieve their water quality goals at a lower cost. Given the
tight budgets that face every jurisdiction, a lower-cost option can mean
the difference between improving water quality and maintaining the
status quo. And cost savings from trading can be substantial: A finance
panel that examined potential trading options for the Chesapeake Bay
area recently concluded that “cap and trade programs . . . could save an
estimated $1 billion in wastewater treatment costs if fully leveraged” to
meet the Chesapeake Bay’s nutrient reduction needs.4
Water quality trading can also provide dischargers more flexibility
in meeting pollutant load-reduction requirements. Trading can help
identify options for meeting water-quality based National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System permit limits and can provide financial
incentives for point source dischargers to install pollution-control
technologies that exceed current performance requirements. The
development of a water quality trading system may deliver significant
economic and environmental benefits—but also poses distinct
challenges. This article examines the water quality trading market as it
exists today, and, by drawing comparisons between the wetland
mitigation banking industry and the nascent water quality trading
market, identifies the challenges and opportunities that market may
face in the future.
A Water Quality Trading Market in Nonpoint Source Pollution
Credits
To date the majority of water quality trading activity has occurred
among point source dischargers, i.e., facilities with NPDES permits.
While this type of trading has added flexibility and improved cost
savings, it will only go so far toward improving the condition of our
nation’s waterways. Further progress depends upon how well we can
cost-effectively eliminate nonpoint source pollution, such as
agricultural runoff and urban stormwater. In watersheds where both
point and nonpoint sources contribute to excessive nutrient loading,
and point source abatement costs are significantly higher than
nonpoint source abatement costs, a market that allows trading
among point and nonpoint source dischargers can be an essential
tool for improving water quality.
Why, then, haven’t we seen more trades involving nonpoint source
dischargers? First, nonpoint source dischargers do not have to meet
regulatory discharge limits, and so have few incentives to seek non-
conventional pollution-reduction options such as water quality trades.
Second, nonpoint source dischargers face more uncertainty than point
source dischargers when trying to estimate pollutant loads and
reductions. Nonpoint source pollutant loads are affected by complex
factors such as precipitation variability, diverse methods for improving
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land practices, and a variable time lag between implementation of
pollution controls and measurable results.
These difficulties are real, but certainly are not insurmountable. To
maximize the potential environmental and economic benefits of water
quality trading, we must find a way to expand the market beyond
single-facility trades to trades that occur on a watershed scale among
numerous point and nonpoint source pollutant dischargers.
Incorporating Wetlands into Water Quality Trading
One way to foster a point and nonpoint source trading market is to
encourage trades involving wetlands. Wetlands strategically located in
a watershed and designed to maximize filtration benefits could be used
to generate pollution-reduction credits, improving water quality by
capturing nutrients and sediment and generating water quality credits
that could be used by dischargers to comply with NPDES permit limits.
Other activities designed to reduce nonpoint source pollution, such as
streambank stabilization, conservation tillage, and erosion control, could
also be used in a banking system for nonpoint source credits.
Constructed wetlands have been proven effective at removing
nutrients and sediment from wastewater treatment plant effluent when
the wetlands are co-located at a discharging facility. In 2002 Don Hey,
senior vice-president of the nonprofit Wetlands Initiative, suggested
the term “nitrogen farming” be used to describe the practice of
constructing or restoring wetlands as a means of reducing nitrogen
concentrations along the Illinois River.5 Further study and
demonstration is needed, however, to quantify the ability of treatment
wetlands to produce nitrogen, phosphorus, and sediment water quality
credits. While this effort might focus initially on wetlands specifically
constructed to “treat” runoff, managers should maintain a preference
for high-functioning wetlands that would provide biodiversity and
habitat benefits as well water quality functions. The chance to restore,
create, and enhance wetlands, helping meet national wetland goals while at
the same time lowering the costs of achieving water quality goals and
advancing water quality trading, is an unparalleled opportunity.
Learning from Wetland Mitigation Banking
The water quality trading industry will need to develop stable processes
for offering a suite of nonpoint source pollution-reducing measures,
including wetland-related activities, as commodities in a water quality
trading market, and the experiences of the wetland mitigation banking
industry can be instructive in this regard. Over the last 10 years the
number of wetland mitigation banks operating across the country has
increased dramatically. This is in large part due to the 1995 Federal
Guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of Mitigation Banks.6
The guidance helped establish a market for wetland mitigation banking
by defining bank operational parameters, suggesting planning
considerations, and setting up a process for bank review and approval.
Instead of entrepreneurial bankers, a water quality trading market
might be populated by third-party credit “brokers” who facilitate
trades between point and nonpoint source dischargers. A nonpoint
source credit broker, such as a watershed organization, farming co-op,
or private party, could help connect point and nonpoint source
dischargers by supplying, certifying, and guaranteeing pollution-
reduction credits. The broker could work with farmers to identify,
implement, and monitor on-farm practices that could be exchanged
for nutrient reduction credits and sold to point source dischargers. A
credit broker could locate and aggregate credits from multiple
nonpoint source dischargers within a watershed or basin. Brokers
could lower overall transaction costs by helping overcome the
inefficiencies associated with dischargers individually having to
negotiate and secure credits from multiple nonpoint source credit
suppliers. Brokers also might be able to secure “escrow” or back-up
credits more readily to cover any situations in which purchased credits
do not materialize.
A market could emerge that would provide nonpoint source credits
to point source dischargers, helping them meet permit obligations in
much the same way that the wetland credit market emerged to help
section 404 permittees meet Clean Water Act mitigation
requirements. To the extent that entrepreneurial banking has been
successful at solving persistent problems in wetland mitigation
quality and management, it is worth considering how a regulatory
structure resembling the banking format could be developed for
water quality trading. It is also worth considering what challenges
such an effort would face.
Liability
At the inception of the wetland mitigation banking industry, regulatory
and entrepreneurial partners realized that the legal and financial liability
for site failure would have to be transferred from the mitigation credit
purchaser to the third-party mitigator. This transfer is essential because
the commodity in wetland banking is not healthy wetlands or clean
water. Rather, it is the less concrete service of regulatory relief. Developers
and polluters have no utility in clean water or healthy wetlands; what
they want is a rapid permit process and the avoidance of liability for
mitigation site failure. Thus, if they cannot purchase a release from
liability as a part of the commodity, there is really no reason for them
to go to the market.
The lack of clear provisions for long-term liability and maintenance
has been an area of ecological concern in mitigation banking. The
water quality trading industry need not go down the same path.
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Because it does not offer release from liability for site failure, the
water quality system as it currently stands offers a commodity of only
marginal interest to the pollutant dischargers who also are potential water
quality credit purchasers, or at least a commodity with a significant
drawback. They can discharge elevated pollutant loads, but must constantly
monitor and maintain the mitigation measures that compensate for those
elevated loads. Because the ecological performance of compensation sites is
typically variable, and the techniques for measuring performance are poorly
standardized, this will be a considerable task. The market-based solution
may do little to solve the permittee’s regulatory dilemma.
Transfer of legal and financial liability from the credit purchaser to
another person or institution is one way of creating a more desirable
commodity. Where this transfer is made impossible by statute (as with the
NPDES program), other measures such as mandatory bonding and
financial assurances can provide a similar liability-minimizing function.
Unfortunately, the institutions that normally provide financial
assurances, such as bonding companies, have proven quite leery of
underwriting the wetland mitigation bankers’ assumption of liability. Even
in regions with highly developed mitigation banking markets, it can be
challenging for a banker without pre-existing networks of trust within the
financial industry to find a bonding agency willing to stand behind the
bizarre-sounding proposition of selling wetlands. Water quality credit
providers would face a similar problem.
The concept of a “phased release” from liability, in which the financial
assurances decrease as a wetland achieves performance standards, was from
the outset a concession to the banking industry and may not be necessary in
water quality trading. Much of regulators’ experience at established wetland
mitigation banking sites suggests that the theory behind phased release
makes the economically tidy but ecologically unrealistic assumption that
wetland banks will follow a linear trajectory towards full achievement of
performance standards, and that there will be no backsliding. Where the
best management practices that improve water quality by reducing
nonpoint source pollution are concerned, there may be an even less clear
purported “trajectory” toward environmental improvement.
The issue of the duration of liability is also complex. The wetland
mitigation banking system has generally used a monitoring period of five
years, after which the long-term site manager (usually a state or local resource
agency) is charged with maintaining the site, using whatever monies have
been established by the banker. The lack of clear provisions for long-term
liability and maintenance has been an area of ecological concern in
mitigation banking, and in fact with all section 404 mitigation. The water
quality trading industry need not go down the same path.
Agency Review
Mitigation Bank Review Teams (MBRTs) oversee the development of
wetland mitigation bank proposals and instruments, certify the release of
credits, and evaluate bank site progress through monitoring reports. The
collaboration- and consensus-based process used by the MBRTs has done
much in some regions to build trust among state and federal regulatory
agencies, whose representatives serve on the teams, and to make an uncertain
regulatory environment far more predictable for bankers. Where MBRTs
function well, they can effectively exert a stabilizing influence on supply and
demand without interfering in bankers’ business decisions, while also
providing credibility and oversight to the industry.
Given the potential benefit of the MBRT process, it is important also to
note that MBRTs function poorly or not at all in many regions, and in some
cases impede the development of the wetland banking market by failing to
adopt firm decision timelines and applying professional judgment or federal
guidance in a capricious or selective (from the bankers’ perspective) manner.
The purpose of an MBRT, and its potential analog in the arena of water
quality trading, is to accelerate and render predictable the process of
interagency consultation when large and controversial projects are being
proposed. However, the 1995 banking guidance does not allow for the full
realization of this purpose because, as guidance, it was unable to establish
disciplined bank-review timelines and dispute-resolution procedures.
Rather, the guidance left the bank-establishment process open to the
vagaries of regional staff workload priorities. Consequently, some regional
and district branches of MBRT-participating federal agencies have not been
particularly rigorous in prioritizing MBRT attendance or training for
MBRT participants. Unfortunately, because of the spatially dispersed
nature of the nonpoint source pollution-reducing best management
practices that would generate credits for a water quality trading market, the
kind of site review that is key in the MBRT process will be physically much
more difficult for the water quality trading industry than it is for wetland
banking, since the latter developed to meet the regulatory need for the spatial
consolidation of mitigation.
Any market in water quality must begin with an interagency team that
is empowered to certify and release credits, both for the purposes of
coordinating market supply with demand and for assuring public faith in
the process. Regulatory language must mandate firm MBRT timelines and
regular meetings, or else the benefits of the MBRT process will be realized
only occasionally, and unpredictably.
The Future of Water Quality Trading
The developments over the last 10 years in the field of wetland
mitigation banking are instructive for the future of water quality
trading in the United States, especially if regulators seek to expand
the market to include more nonpoint source trading on a watershed
scale. Lessons from the wetland mitigation banking industry can
inform the development of future nonpoint source pollution credit
banking markets, and also help incorporate wetlands in water quality
trading programs.
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